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UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 2B
& THE STATE CONTRACT LAW-FEDERAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
INTERFACE: CAN STATE STATUTES
EVEN BEGIN TO ADDRESS COPYRIGHT
PREEMPTION OF SHRINK-WRAP LICENSES?1
INTRODUCTION
The information industry generates over 90 billion dollars a year
selling software and data,2 and this information is increasingly
being distributed in digital form.3 The ease with which digital
products can be copied4 coupled with advances in technology,
particularly the Internet, undermine the information industry's
control over subsequent distribution and use of their products.5
Intellectual property laws provide one way for companies to prevent
undesirable uses of their products. Companies, however, increas-
ingly rely on contract law, specifically shrink-wrap licenses, to force
customers to adhere to restrictions on uses of software and data.'
1 Many thanks to Professor Julian McDonnell and Professor Paul Heald for their
guidance on this project.
2 Raymond T. Nimmer et al., License Contracts Under Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code: A Proposal, 19 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 281, 283 (1993).
s Maureen A. O'Rourke, Copyright Preemption After the ProCD Case: A Market-Based
Approach, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 53, 53 (1997). The scope of this article is limited to
shrink-wrap licenses used in the mass-market context to license the use of software and data
in digital form, regardless of how the information is distributed, for example, by traditional
retail sale or via the Internet. The terms "information" and "software," as used in this
article, mean software and data in digital form.
' See generally Maureen A. O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary Between Copyright and
Contract: Copyright Preemption of Software License Terms, 45 DUKE L.J. 479, 483 (1995)
(explaining the difference between "hard and soft copy worlds").
'Tom Quinlan, Software Buyers Wary of New Consumer Code, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS,
Apr. 20, 1997, at D1 (quoting Kaye Caldwell, President, Silicon Valley Software Industry
Coalition, as saying, "you can't copy a pair of pants and bring it back to the store. There has
to be recognition that software is different from other products."). But see Niva Elkin-Koren,
Copyright Policy and the Limits of Freedom of Contract, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 93, 94
(1997) (arguing that advances in technology and dissemination of information "on-line"
enable software producers to increase control of digital products through technological
fencing).
6 See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 39 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1161 (7th Cir. 1996)
(upholding a shrink-wrap license restricting use); Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and
Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1239, 1239 (1995) (noting that "software vendors
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Shrink-wrap licenses are non-negotiated, standard form contracts
that are attached to software products either inside the plastic
wrapping (hence, "shrink-wrap" license), inside the box, or on-line
as a prerequisite to loading the software. These agreements are
imposed on almost all purchasers of software and have become
ubiquitous7 as software has become an increasingly mass-market
product.8
Although most consumers probably do not notice shrink-wrap
licenses, much less read the terms to which they are agreeing,9 the
enforceability of such licenses greatly concerns the information
industry, law makers, and academics because of the pervasive use
of these contracts in the information industry' ° and the general
uncertainty as to their legal efficacy." Courts considering the
validity of shrink-wrap licenses have analyzed two legal issues:
Whether shrink-wrap licenses and their terms are valid as a matter
of contract law, and whether shrink-wrap licenses and terms that
modify intellectual property rights are preempted by federal
copyright law.' 2
The American Law Institute is currently drafting a new Uniform
Commercial Code provision 3 to resolve these issues. U.C.C.
Article 2B expressly validates non-negotiated, standard form,
are attempting en masse to 'opt out' of intellectual property law by drafting license provisions
that compel their customers to adhere to more restrictive provisions than copyright (and
even patent) law would require."). See generally, id. at 1241-48 (outlining the history of
shrink-wrap licenses in the information industry).
' Lemley, supra note 6, at 1241; see generally Comments of the Information Industry
Association on Article 2B and Prof. Charles McManis' Proposed Amendment to section 2B-
308 (July 18, 1997) (on file with author) (stating that the use of mass-market licenses is the
current industry practice).
8 O'Rourke, supra note 4, at n.59 (noting Professor Merges' findings that prepackaged
software accounts for about seventy percent of industry revenues).
9 Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Tightening up on Software Licenses: Industry Urges Panel on
State Laws to Add Legal Backing, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 1997, at El.
"See supra notes 1-7 (evidencing concern over the enforceability of shrink-wrap licenses).
'1 Compare, e.g., Lemley, supra note 6, at 1259 (noting with approval that shrink-wrap
licenses are generally held unenforceable by courts) with O'Rourke, supra note 3, at 63-77
(evaluating the competing views of shrink-wrap license enforceability and arguing that a
recent case enforcing such a license was correctly decided, contrary to academic thought and
the views of other courts).
12 Lemley, supra note 6, at 1248-59.
13 U.C.C. Art. 2B (Proposed Draft Jan. 20, 1997) (titled "Licenses").
[Vol. 6:119
2
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol6/iss1/5
U.C.C. ARTICLE 2B
shrink-wrap licenses under state contract law.'4 In addition to
resolving the contract formation issue, the drafters of Article 2B are
struggling with how to address the enforceability of license terms
that modify intellectual property rights under the Copyright Act of
1976.1' The issue of how to address the possible preemption of
mass-market license terms by the Copyright Act has divided the
drafters.
Initially the A.L.I. drafters adopted language that would make
some restrictive license terms unenforceable in light of users' rights
granted under the Copyright Act of 1976.16 Specifically, the A.L.I.
adopted the McManis Proposal, a provision targeting license terms
that expand copyright protection and restrict users' rights under
the Copyright Act. The McManis Proposal responds to criticism
that mass-market licenses function as private legislation modifying
the copyright bargain struck by federal law. 7 The National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL),
however, decided not to accept the McManis Proposal and has
asked the A.L.I. to reconsider it.' Instead, NCCUSL advocates
Article 2B taking a neutral position regarding federal preemp-
tion.' 9
The schism between the A.L.I. and NCCUSL illustrates the lack
of consensus on this issue. Some critics argue that the license
terms at issue are preempted by the Copyright Act 20 and advocate
state laws that deem such terms unenforceable. 21 Other commen-
tators argue the necessity of using licenses in the digital informa-
tion context 22 and contend that these license terms are not
14 U.C.C. § 2B-308 (Proposed Draft Jan. 20, 1997). Article 2B christens shrink-wrap
licenses "Mass-Market Licenses." U.C.C. § 2B-102(a)(25), and its provisions will govern the
traditional, plastic-wrapped, paper licenses, as well as the newer electronic "clickwrap" and
"webwrap" contract forms. Raymond T. Nimmer, Article 2B: UCC in the Information Age,
U.C.C. BuLL., Nov. 1997, at 1, 4.
" Raymond T. Nimmer, Reporter, Issues List and Update: UCC Article 2B, (visited Aug.
21, 1998) <http//www.ali.orglali/ucc2list.htm>.
'6 See infra Part I.C (discussing the McManis Proposal).
17 Lemley, supra note 6, at 1240.
'8 2B Draft Update, U.C.C. BULL., Oct. 1997, at 11.
19Id.
20 Lemley, supra note 6, at 1240; L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE
NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF USERS RIGHTS 220 (1991).
21 Lemley, supra note 6, at 1240.
' O'Rourke, supra note 3, at 53.
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preempted by the Copyright Act.23 This Note examines the
complexity of the contract-copyright nexus in the information
context and discusses the wisdom of using state statutory law to
address the likelihood that the federal copyright regime preempts
certain license terms.24
The justification for state statutory action in this area is twofold.
First, state action resolves any uncertainty as to enforceability.
Second, state action preserves the rights granted to users by the
Copyright Act. I will argue that these two reasons do not support
state action regarding the preemption issue and that the position
of neutrality adopted by NCCUSL is the correct one. The complexi-
ty of federal preemption law25 means a blanket proscription by
state statute may be overly broad and would unnecessarily
interfere with accepted commercial practice.26 Moreover, the issue
of preemption is ultimately a federal one. In order to avoid a
patchwork of license preemption determinations by state courts and
legislatures, the issue should be addressed on the national level.
In Part I, I discuss the history and terms of the McManis
Proposal. Part II describes the provisions of the Copyright Act
referenced by the McManis Proposal and briefly explains how each
is applicable in the information licensing context. In Part III, I will
analyze the purposes, terms, and effect of typical mass-market
licenses. Part IV reviews current preemption law in the intellectu-
al property context. Part V analyzes how the McManis Proposal
attempts to address the preemption issues and how it impacts the
use and enforceability of mass-market license terms.
2 Id. at 56.
' Section 308 of Article 2B generally validates mass-market licenses as a matter of
contract law, however, issues regarding contract formation and conscionability are outside
the scope of this article. See generally Lemley, supra note 6, at 1248-55 (addressing contract
law problems with enforcing shrink-wrap licenses); Stephen Y. Chow, Contracting in
Cyberspace: The Triumph of Forms?, 41 BOSTON B.J., May/June 1997, at 16 (analyzing
contract law problems arising from on-line commerce and mass-market software). Instead,
I focus on whether state statutory contract law should address the enforceability of particular
license terms which may be preempted by federal law.
' Lemley, supra note 6, at 1270 (explaining the difficulty of applying federal preemption
rules in the intellectual property context).
' In many cases interference with commercial practice is necessary to advance important
social policies. The U.C.C., however, is fundamentally a commercial tool whose "goals are
to facilitate, not disrupt, and to support, not redirect, commercial practice." Nimmer, supra
note 14, at 2.
[Vol. 6:119
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I. THE MCMANIS PROPOSAL
A. U.C.C. ARTICLE 2B
The American Law Institute (A.L.I.) is currently drafting a new
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) provision titled "Licenses."27
Article 2B is intended to govern transactions involving "licenses of
information and software contracts."28  When a transaction
involves both information and goods, Article 2B "applies to the
information and to copies of the information, its packaging, and
documentation."2 9 The statute does not create new contract law
applicable to intellectual property and information, but rather it
codifies established commercial practice in that industry.3 ° Fur-
thermore, the guiding principles of the drafters include paralleling
intellectual property laws when possible and remaining neutral
with respect to complex federal preemption issues.
The paradigmatic transaction under Article 2B is a license to use
information.3 The information products whose licenses are
governed by Article 2B are likely to include both copyrightable
subject matter and information that is not protectable under the
Copyright Act because it is in the public domain 2 or lacks the
requisite originality. Although Article 2B applies to licensing
transactions and leaves sale of goods transactions to U.C.C. Article
2, an exception is carved out for the sale of computer software. All
transactions involving computer software are covered by Article 2B
regardless of whether the transaction involves a license or a
sale.34
U.C.C. Art. 2B (Proposed Draft Jan. 20, 1997).
28 U.C.C. § 2B-103(a) (defining article 2B's scope).
U.C.C. § 2B-103(c).
o Nimmer, supra note 14, at 3.
3' Nimmer, supra note 14, at 2.
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994).
Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1275
(1991) (holding alphabetical telephone directory did not have the statutorily and constitution-
ally required originality for federal copyright protection); see, e.g., ProCD, Inc., v. Zeidenberg,
86 F.3d 1447, 1453-55, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1116 (7th Cir. 1996) (enforcing shrink-wrap
license prohibiting copying of telephone directory data in software). The distinction between
copyrightable and non-copyrightable information is a factor in the analysis of the impact of
license terms. See discussion infra Part IV.
34 U.C.C. § 2B-103 (Proposed Draft Jan. 20, 1997) (reporter's notes).
1998] 123
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B. SECTION 308 & MASS-MARKET LICENSES
Article 2B is intended to govern licensing transactions in a broad
range of commercial contexts including non-negotiated, retail
purchases. Section 308, entitled "Mass-market Licenses," addresses
issues regarding the licenses typically used in such retail transac-
tions.35 Article 2B defines mass-market license to mean a license
used in a "transaction in a retail market involving information
directed to the general public as a whole under substantially the
same terms for the same information, and involving an end-user
licensee that acquired the information under terms and in a
quantity consistent with an ordinary transaction in the general
retail distribution."36 This definition includes transactions involv-
ing individual consumers and some small businesses.3"
In the past, courts have been unclear as to whether mass-market
licenses met the contract formation requirements of state contract
law, and whether the adhesion character of the contract prevented
the incorporation of all terms. The main purposes of section 308
are to recognize that the use of mass-market licenses is standard
commercial practice and to codify the general enforceability of those
licenses and their terms. The drafters provide this explanation of
Article 2B's focus on mass-market licenses:
The basic principle lies in the fact that in commercial
agreements, standard form use is widely and broadly
acceptable. It provides a number of economies in
transaction costs and, quite simply, provides a
strongly supported commercial practice. Article 2B
adopts the position that standard forms used to
document an agreement are enforceable so long as
U.C.C. § 2B-308.
" U.C.C. § 2B-102(a)(29) (Proposed Draft Nov. 1, 1997).
37 U.C.C. § 2B, Part 1 (Proposed Draft Jan. 20, 1997) (introductory paragraph titled
"Context"). The preface to Article 2B states that "[tihis Article creates the idea of a 'mass-
market' contract that achieves a shift away from traditional patterns in the U.C.C. which
focus on 'consumers.' The term moves to a retail marketplace definition in which consumers
and some businesses are treated under the same protective law." Id.
124 [Vol. 6:119
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the party being charged with the terms of the form
manifested its assent to the form. 8
The drafters recognized, however, that state contract laws, that
is, the U.C.C., that approve the use of mass-market licenses and
terms generally, are not impervious to preemption by federal law
on specific matters. Two related but separate concerns reinforce
the need to recognize and to deal with the possibility of preemption:
First, the desire to codify commercial practice and to ensure the
general enforceability of mass-market licenses under state contract
law; and second, concerns that some restrictive license terms may
deny licensees their rights under the Copyright Act. 9 While
Article 2B section 308 addresses the validity of mass-market
licenses generally, the McManis Proposal attempts to address the
latter concern.
C. THE MCMANIS PROPOSAL
During the Article 2B drafting meeting at the A.L.I. Annual
Meeting in May of 1997,40 Charles McManis, a Professor at the
Washington University School of Law, proposed an amendment to
Article 2B section 308 on mass-market licenses.4 The committee
voted to adopt his proposal by a narrow margin.42 The McManis
Proposal provides that a mass-market license term that is inconsis-
tent with certain provisions of the Copyright Act cannot become
part of the contract.43 The proposal addresses the complex
3 U.C.C. § 2B-307 (Proposed Draft 1996); see also U.C.C. § 2B, Part 1 (Proposed Draft
1996) (justifying the enforceability of mass-market licenses under Article 2B on the grounds
that "[nlo other position would be workable in modem commercial practice").
17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1101 (1994).
40 The American Law Institute 74th Annual Meeting, (visited Oct. 4, 1998)
<httpJ/www.ali.org/ali/aliamprg.htm>. The 74th Annual Meeting of the A.L.I. was held in
Washington, D.C., from May 19,1997 to May 22, 1997.
41 Charles R. McManis, U.C.C. Article 2B: Motions Submitted in Advance (visited Aug.
23, 1998) <http'/www.ali.org/ali/mcmanis.htm> [hereinafter "McManis Proposal"] (moving
to amend section 2B-308 of the U.C.C. Article 2B Discussion Draft to add subsection (h)).42 Actions taken on 1997 Annual Meeting Drafts: Uniform Commercial Code Article 2B
(licenses), Discussion Draft (visited Nov. 10,1997) <http://www.ali.org/ali/amupdate.htm> ("A
motion by Prof. Charles R. McManis to add a new subsection (h) to § 2B-308 of the
Discussion Draft for Article 2B ... was approved by a vote of 86 - 83.").
" McManis Proposal, supra note 41.
19981
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relationship between private rights created by contract law, that is,
licenses, and the property rights conferred by federal copyright law.
Where contract and copyright rights conflict, the proposal attempts
to dodge the preemption bullet" by ensuring private contract
rights created under the U.C.C. do not contravene the federal
scheme of property rights under the Copyright Act of 1976. 45
Specifically, McManis proposed amending section 308 to prohibit
enforcement of mass-market license terms which are "inconsistent"
with Copyright Act provisions that confer rights on users of
information.46 McManis' purpose in amending section 308 was to
"create greater certainty as to the enforceability of mass-market
licenses by avoiding ... the possibility of conflict with, and
consequent preemption by, federal copyright and/or federal patent
law. 4 7
The drafting committee recognized that any state statute
governing information and software transactions would necessarily
have to confront "Federal Intellectual Property Interface" issues.48
When confronted with such an interface, the policy guiding the
Article 2B drafters is to either design the U.C.C. rules to parallel
and be consistent with preemptive federal law,49 or to adopt a
position of neutrality.5 0
The text of the amendment proposed by Professor McManis and
adopted by the A.L.I. is as follows: "A [mass-market license] term
that is inconsistent with 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) or with the limitations
on exclusive rights contained in 17 U.S.C. sections 107-112 and 117
14 McManis Proposal, supra note 41. The supporting comments to the motion state that
subsection (h) is intended 'to create greater certainty as to the enforceability of mass-market
licenses by avoiding, or at least reducing, the possibility of ... preemption by ... federal
intellectual property law." Id.
46 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1101 (1998).
46 McManis Proposal, supra note 41.
41 Id. (supporting comments to motion).
'8 Nimmer, supra note 15 (recognizing "there are many cases where preemptive federal
rules apply"); see also U.C.C. § 2B-104 (Proposed Draft Jan. 20, 1997) (comments) (noting
that the article is subject to preemptive federal law).
'9 Nimmer, supra note 15, at 7 (adopting parallel position on issue of transferability of
copyright subject matter).
' Id. (adopting neutral position with respect to "uncertain, complex, or currently
controversial issues," for example, the fair use of information products).
126 [Vol. 6:119
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cannot become part of a contract under this section."5 The
proposal's text, though not self-explanatory, is clarified by McManis
in his commentaries. The license terms which McManis perceives
to be inconsistent with the Copyright Act fit in two general
categories: (1) license terms that prohibit reverse engineering to
access noncopyrightable ideas, procedures, processes, systems,
methods of operation, concepts, principles, discovery, or data;5 2
and (2) license terms that prohibit non-infringing uses of copyright-
able subject matter, including section 107 fair uses, uses allowed
under the "safe haven" provisions of sections 108-112, and uses
permitted under section 117. 53
Critics of the McManis Proposal find its language susceptible to
interpretations that are even more restrictive than the meaning
intended by its proponent. Responding to A.L.I.'s adoption of the
provision, the information industry strongly contested the provision
holding terms inconsistent with section 102(b)' unenforceable.55
" McManis Proposal, supra note 41 (adopted as section 2B-308(h)). The motion originally
posed an alternative amendment to the one adopted. The alternative amendment provided:
(h) A term that prohibits:
(1) any act of reverse engineering (including decompilation or
disassembly) of computer programs for the purpose of a)
achieving the interoperability of an independently created
computer program with other computer programs, or b) gaining
access to any uncopyrightable and unpatented idea, procedure,
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle,
discovery, or data; or
(2) the fair use, as defined by 17 U.S.C. section 107, of the
results of any act of reverse engineering specified in subsection
(h)(1); cannot be enforced to prohibit any act of reverse
engineering specified in subsection (h)(1) which a) is performed
by a licensee or by another person having a right to use a copy
of a computer program, or on their behalf by a person autho-
rized to do so; and b) is indispensable for one of the purposes
specified in subsection (h)(1).
McManis Proposal, supra note 41.
52 See, e.g., Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1520-28, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1561, 1566 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that under section 107 of the Copyright Act a
party in rightful possession of a copyrightable computer program may undertake necessary
efforts, including disassembly or decompilation, to gain an understanding of the unprotected
functional elements of the program).
' McManis Proposal, supra note 41, at n.1 (supporting comments).
5 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994).
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They interpreted that clause to mean mass-market licenses could
not be used to protect information that was not copyrightable
subject matter.56 This posed a potential problem for companies
that sell uncopyrightable data. In response to this complaint,
McManis asserted that information outside the scope of copyright
subject matter, and thus federal copyright protection, can be
neither legislated by Congress, nor can Congress preempt the
states from legislating in that area." Therefore, a license term
prohibiting copying of noncopyrightable data would not be prohibit-
ed by the McManis Proposal, contrary to the information industry
interpretation of the proposed statute. This dispute over the scope
of preemption under section 102(b) illustrates the fundamental
problem with using a state statute to regulate complex preemption
issues generally.
The underlying justification for not enforcing certain license
terms is to prevent later preemption under the Copyright Act 58 or
the Supremacy Clause.59 As McManis himself admits, however,
the existing federal appellate case law is unsettled on this issue.6 °
A central difficulty with a statutory provision rejecting license
terms inconsistent with rights granted by the Copyright Act is that
the scope of those rights is unclear.6' In fact, courts have had
Comments of the Information Industry Association on Article 2B and Prof. Charles
McManis' Proposed Amendment to section 2B-308 (July 18, 1997) (on file with author);
Letter from James R. Maxeiner, Vice President & Associate General Counsel, Dun &
Bradstreet, to C. Ronald Ellington, NCCUSL Commissioner (July 18, 1997) (on file with
author); Letter from Michael L. Meyer, Schift Hardin & Waite, to C. Ronald Ellington,
NCCUSL Commissioner (July 18, 1997) (on file with author).
6Comments of the Information Industry Association on Article 2B and Prof. Charles
McManis' Proposed Amendment to section 2B-308 (July 18, 1997) (on file with author);
Letter from James R. Maxeiner, Vice President & Associate General Counsel, Dun &
Bradstreet, to C. Ronald Ellington, NCCUSL Commissioner (July 18, 1997) (on file with
author); Letter from Michael L. Meyer, Schift Hardin & Waite, to C. Ronald Ellington,
NCCUSL Commissioner (July 18, 1997) (on file with author).
"' Memorandum from Charles R. McManis, to Commissioner Carlyle Ring, Chairman,
NCCUSL Article 2B Drafting Committee 2 (August 19, 1997) (on file with author).
"17 U.S.C. § 301 (1994).
59 U.S. CONST. art. VI.
6o McManis Proposal, supra note 41, at n.1 (supporting comments). The current case law
is discussed infra Part IV.A.
61 For example, only a few courts have applied the fair use doctrine to computer
programs, and those cases are disputes involving reverse engineering. Bradley W. Grout,
Note, Wobbling on the Shoulders of Giants: The Supreme Court's Failure in Lotus v. Borland,
128 [Vol. 6:119
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difficulty applying the Copyright Act to software generally.62 The
uncertainty as to how users' rights are defined in the digital
information context means the drafters of Article 2B can only guess
which license terms are preempted because they unduly restrict
those rights. Although McManis sees the "unsettled" state of law
in this area as a reason to tackle copyright issues in the U.C.C., a
statutory provision tying mass-market license enforceability to
federal laws, which are themselves unsettled in the information
context, may do little to "create greater certainty" 3 about the
validity of these licenses.
The next section briefly explains the Copyright Act provisions
referenced by the McManis Proposal and how they apply in the
information mass-market license context.
IL COPYRIGHT LAW
The McManis Proposal deems unenforceable contract terms
inconsistent with sections 102(b), 107-112, and 117 of the Copyright
Act of 1976.' These provisions can be divided into two categories:
(1) those addressing the scope of copyrightable subject matter; and
(2) those creating users' rights.
A. COPYRIGHTABLE SUBJECT MATTER: 17 U.S.C. § 102
The first prong of the McManis Proposal provides that a mass-
market license term "inconsistent with 17 U.S.C. section 102(b)...
4 J. IN'TELL. PROP. L. 77, 116 (1997).
' Compare, e.g., Whelan Assoc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 230
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 481 (3d Cir. 1986) with Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d
693, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241 (2d Cir. 1992) (offering two different tests for determining
copyrightable elements of software); compare ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640,
38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1513 (W.D. Wis. 1996) with ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447,
39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (7th Cir. 1996) (conflicting views on the preemption of shrink-
wrap license terms by the Copyright Act). See also Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc.,
49 F.3d 807, 815, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1014 (1st Cir. 1995) aftd by an equally divided Court,
516 U.S. 233 (1996) (finding computer macros uncopyrightable methods of operation under
17 U.S.C. § 102(b)); Grout, supra note 61, at 88 (noting the current "multiplicity of judicial
approaches" to infringement suits as evidence of the "confusion that still surrounds the
copyrightability of computer programs").
6 McManis Proposal, supra note 41 (supporting comments).
6 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(b), 107-12, 117 (1994).
1998] 129
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cannot become part of a contract under this section."" Section
102(a) of the Copyright Act defines copyrightable subject matter
under the Act.66 Under this definition, computer software and
electronic databases, the primary targets of the mass-market
licenses governed by section 308,67 are "literary works" and
therefore protected as copyrightable subject matter.6" The Act
limits copyright protection, however, to an author's original
expression as fixed in a tangible medium.69 Furthermore, the Act
excludes from its protective ambit the ideas contained in the
protected expression.7 °
Section 102(b) excludes "any idea, procedure, process, system,
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery" from copyright
protection. 71  The language of the Act recognizes that noncopy-
rightable material may exist within a protected original work of
65 U.C.C. § 2B-308(h) (Proposed Draft Jan. 20, 1997); supra note 51 and accompanying
text.
6' The statute provides:
Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now
known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced,
or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine
or device. Works of authorship include the following categories:
1. literary works;
2. musical works, including any accompanying words;
3. dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
4. pantomimes and choreographic works;
5. pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
6. motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
7. sound recordings; and
8. architectural works.
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
67 U.C.C. § 2B-308.
" Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l., 49 F.3d 807, 817, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1014, 1023
(1st Cir. 1995) affd by equally divided Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996) (explaining that "computer
programs, unlike VCRs, are copyrightable as 'literary works' [under] 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)");
Charles R. McManis, Intellectual Property Protection and Reverse Engineering of Computer
Programs in the United States and the European Community, 8 HIGH TECH. L.J. 25, 33-34
(1993) (noting that computer generated screen displays are protected under 102(a)(5) as
pictorial or graphic works). This article is limited to a discussion of information products
that are literary works. The same analysis, however, may also apply to mass-market
licenses of other types of copyrightable subject matter.
69 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
70 Id. § 102(b).
71 Id.
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authorship and expressly does not extend protection to noncopy-
rightable material "regardless of the form in which it is described,
explained, illustrated or embodied in such a work." 2 Section
102(b) is generally recognized as a codification of the idea-expres-
sion dichotomy, 3 which was first enunciated in Baker v.
Selden." Although courts have had difficulty applying the idea-
expression dichotomy to computer programs, 5 it has functioned
as a very real limitation on the ability of software producers to win
copyright infringement cases. 6 The Act's originality require-
ment" also limits the ability of software producers to protect
certain parts of computer programs78 and some databases.79
72 id.
71 Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc. 982 F.2d 693, 704,23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241, 1251
(2d Cir. 1992) (recognizing that "computer programs hover even more closely to the elusive
boundary line [between idea and expression] described in § 102(b) [sic]"); Whelan Assocs.,
Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 481 (3d Cir. 1986); see
also McManis, supra note 68, at 40-41 (explaining the section 102(b) idea-expression
dichotomy, its corollary, the merger doctrine, and the analogous fact-expression dichotomy).
74 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
75 ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE
889 (1997) (noting that every court to confront the issue since 1992 has chosen the Altai
test).
'See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807,34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1014
(1st Cir 1995); Computer Assoc. Int'l v. Altai, Inc. 982 F.2d 693, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241
(2d Cir. 1992); MERGES ET AL., supra note 75, at 888 (1997) (noting that the Altai test itself
"has been bitterly attacked by lawyers and scholars representing large computer compa-
nies").
7 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994).
71 Some parts of computer programs fall into the scenes a faire category of unprotectable
information because they are so commonly used in all programs. Grout, supra note 61, at
114-16. Other parts of a program may not be copyrightable because of the idea-expression
dichotomy and the merger doctrine. McManis, supra note 68, at 40-41.
7' After Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., compilations must be
original in selection and arrangement in order to receive protection under the Copyright Act.
499 U.S. 340, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1275 (1991). The Court held that the alphabetical
telephone directory at issue did not have the statutorily and constitutionally required
originality for federal copyright protection. Thus, both courts that examined the recent
ProCD case presumed that the copied database, which was a compilation of phone numbers,
was not protected by the Copyright Act. Compare ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp.
640, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1513 (W.D. Wis. 1996) (ProCD I) with ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg,
86 F.3d 1447, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (7th Cir. 1996) (ProCD II) (notwithstanding
agreement about lack of copyright protection, conflicting views on the enforceability of
shrink-wrap licenses exist).
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Computer companies, losing infringement cases because the
information they seek to protect is not copyrightable subject
matter,80 are relying on contract causes of action to protect their
products.8' Mass-market license terms that prohibit all copying8 2
grant copyright-like protection to elements of software and
databases that are not protected under the federal copyright
regime.m Furthermore, license terms that prohibit reverse
engineering prevent a user from even accessing the noncopyright-
able portions of an otherwise copyrightable program.' Thus,
under the first prong of the McManis proposal, there are potentially
two types of license terms inconsistent with section 102(b) of the
Copyright Act: (1) license terms that prohibit copying of uncopy-
rightable subject matter and thus grant copyright-like protection to
uncopyrightable subject matter; and (2) license terms that prevent
reverse engineering, that is, copying copyrightable information for
the limited purpose of gaining access to uncopyrightable informa-
tion.'3
The second prong of the McManis Proposal addresses license
terms that are inconsistent with the Copyright Act's limitations on
the copyright owner's rights because such terms grant expanded
protection to copyrightable information at the expense of users'
rights. The next section analyzes this prong.
B. LIMITATIONS ON EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS UNDER THE COPYRIGHT ACT
OF 1976: 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-112, 117
The second prong of the McManis Proposal provides that a mass-
market license term "inconsistent ... with the limitations on
exclusive rights contained in 17 U.S.C. sections 107-112 and 117
8 17 U.S.C. § 102.
"1 See, e.g., ProCD II, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454 (enforcing that shrink-wrap license used to
restrict copying and distribution of white pages directory not copyright protected after Feist).
See, e.g., West Software License Agreement (1997 West Publ'g) (on file with author).
See supra notes 66-79 and accompanying text (discussing limitation on protection under
the Copyright Act).
8 Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1015, 1024 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding reverse engineering to access noncopyrightable
information a fair use under 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994)).
8 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994).
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cannot become part of a contract under this section."86 The seven
Copyright Act provisions cited in this prong limit the exclusive
rights granted to copyright owners by section 106.87 At the same
time, these provisions grant certain rights to users of copyrighted
works.88 A brief explanation of the key provisions and their
application in the digital information context follows.89
1. 17 U.S.C. § 107: The Fair Use Provision. The fair use
privilege is one of the most contested rights in the information
' McManis Proposal, supra note 41.
87 The statute provides:
Subject to sections 107 through 120, the owner of copyright under this
title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
1. to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorec-
ords;
2. to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted
work;
3. to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work
to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by
rental, lease, or lending;
4. in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual
works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly;
5. in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works,
including the individual images of a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; and
6. in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted
work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
17 U.S.C. §§ 107-12, 117.
' The main purpose of the McManis Proposal is to preserve "fair uses" of copyrightable
information under the Copyright Act. McManis Proposal, supra note 41. Therefore, this
section focuses on fair uses granted under the Act. Application of 17 U.S.C. §§ 110-112 in
the digital information context and, in particular, in the mass-market license context is
unclear, but it appears there may be some rights conferred to users of multimedia software.
There has been no commentary or case law on the application of these provisions to the
narrow circumstances concerning this article, and therefore, I will only mention them briefly
as a potential source of users' rights: 17 U.S.C. § 110 allows certain performances and
displays of copyrighted works without the permission of the owner; section 111 allows
secondary transmissions works; and section 112 allows "ephemeral recordings" of copyrighted
works without permission. In sum, users of audio, visual, or audio-visual works are given
certain rights of use under sections 110 to 112, and those exceptional uses would otherwise
be prohibited by the copyright owners' exclusive rights under section 106. The user rights
created in sections 110 to 112, however, may be abridged by restrictive licenses attached to
multimedia software products.
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context, and in copyright law generally. 90 The statute provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and
106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including
such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or
by any other means specified by that section, for
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom
use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement
of copyright. In determining whether the use made
of a work in any particular case is a fair use the
factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for
or value of the copyrighted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself
bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon
consideration of all the above factors.91
This provision sanctions uses which infringe the copyright
owner's exclusive rights but which are excused because they are
"fair uses."92 The statute lists four factors to be considered by
courts when deciding whether an infringing use is fair or not.93
These factors are not, however, exhaustive. 9 Courts must balance
'o The doctrine of fair use has been the subject of extensive analysis by courts and
commentators, and various approaches for balancing the statute's four factors have been
advocated. See, e.g., Wendy Gordon, Fair Use as a Market Failure: A Structural and
Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982);
Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of
Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PRoP. L. 1, 50 (1997).
9' 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
9 Id.
93 Id.
' The term "including," as used in the Copyright Act, is "illustrative and not limitative,"
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
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the factors, which is a fact intensive exercise that is performed on
an ad hoc basis.9" In the computer software context, courts have
analyzed the fair use doctrine only in cases involving reverse
engineering.96 In addition, there have been no Supreme Court
cases analyzing fair use in the computer software context.97 The
scope of fair use rights, like other areas of users' rights, remains
unsettled. This lack of definition presents a problem for a statute
that measures contract enforceability against these rights.
2. 17 U.S.C. § 108: Reproduction by Libraries and Archives.
This provision grants libraries and archives a qualified right to
make copies of works in limited quantities with some limita-
tions. 8 The copies cannot be made for commercial purposes, the
collection of the institution must be open to the public or research-
ers, and any reproduction or copy by the institution must include
a copyright notice.99 Libraries and archives have a right to the
uses described in this section "notwithstanding" the copyright
owner's "exclusive rights" under section 106. °00 However, the
proprietary use term of a mass-market license could presumably
'Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577,29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1961, 1964
(1994).
"Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1561 (9th Cir.
1992); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1015
(Fed. Cir. 1992); see also Grout, supra note 61, at 116 (discussing Lotus Dev. Corp. v.
Borland Intl, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 815, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1014 (1st Cir. 1995) afld by an
equally divided Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996)).
"' Lotus Dev. Corp., 516 U.S. 233 (summarily affirming the circuit court's opinion).
"17 U.S.C. § 108 (1994).
The legislative history of the statute explains that:
Notwithstanding the exclusive rights of the owners of copyright, section
108 provides that under certain conditions it is not an infringement of
copyright for a library or archives, or any of its employees acting within
the scope of their employment, to reproduce or distribute not more than
one copy or phonorecord of a work, provided (1) the reproduction or
distribution is made without any purpose of direct or indirect commercial
advantage and (2) the collections of the library or archives are open to
the public or available not only to researchers affiliated with the library
or archives, but also to other persons doing research in a specialized
field, and (3) the reproduction or distribution of the work includes a
notice of copyright.
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 74 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5688.
100 17 U.S.C. § 108.
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force a user to waive this right.' °' Libraries expect to be able to
use information in accordance with their users' rights under the
Copyright Act and are concerned that mass-market licenses will
prevent their ability to continue to do so.
10 2
3. 17 U.S.C. § 109: The First Sale Doctrine. This provision of
the Copyright Act grants the owner of a particular copy of a work
the right to "dispose of it by sale, rental, or any other means. "1°3
The language of the statute10 4 and the comments 10 5 indicate
that the first sale doctrine is triggered when .a copyright owner' 6
sells a copy of his work.0 7
Under the first sale doctrine, the copyright owner's exclusive
right of public distribution has no effect upon anyone who owns "a
particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title" and
who wishes to transfer it to someone else or to destroy it. 108 Once
a copyrighted work is sold, the purchaser is free to make subse-
quent transfers.
10 Lemley, supra note 6, at 1245 (listing ways that license terms prohibiting copying
modify user's rights under the Copyright Act).
102 Letter from Professor Oakley, Washington Affairs Representative of the American
Association of Law Libraries, to Professor Raymond Nimmer, Reporter, U.C.C. Article 2B
Drafting Committee (Mar. 27, 1997) (on file with author).
103 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 79.
104 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1994) (granting the right of subsequent disposal to "the owner of a
particular copy").
105 The committee notes give the following example of when the first sale doctrine is
applicable:
Thus, for example, the outright sale of an authorized copy of a book frees
it from any copyright control over its resale price or other conditions of
its future disposition. A library that has acquired ownership of a copy
is entitled to lend it under any conditions it chooses to impose.
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 79.
10 The sale of an infringing copy of a work does not trigger the first sale doctrine:
To come within the scope of section 109(a) [subsec. (a) of this section], a
copy or phonorecord must have been "lawfully made under this title,"
though not necessarily with the copyright owner's authorization. For
example, any resale of an illegally "pirated" phonorecord would be an
infringement, but the disposition of a phonorecord legally made under
the compulsory licensing provisions of section 115 [section 115 of this
title] would not.
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 79.
107 Id.
108 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1994).
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Mass-market licenses allow distributors of information to avoid
making the "first sale" that triggers this limitation. Using a license
instead of a sale to transfer possession of a copy would prevent the
right of subsequent disposal from vesting in a licensee because
there has not been a sale.'°9 Avoiding the first sale doctrine is
one reason that software producers use licenses. 10 The legisla-
tive history of section 109(a) seems to support the validity of
contract limitations on subsequent sales."' Whether the first
sale doctrine and mass-market licenses restricting subsequent
transfers can exist concurrently depends on whether preemption
applies.
4. 17 U.S.C. § 117: Computer Programs. The Copyright Act was
amended in 1980112 to reflect the recommendations of a congres-
sional task force on technology. The task force evaluated the role
of intellectual property law in developing technologies." 3  The
1980 revision provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is
not an infringement for the owner of a copy of a
computer program to make or authorize the making
of another copy or adaptation of that computer
program provided:
(1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as
an essential step in the utilization of the computer
'09 U.C.C. § 2B-501 (Proposed Draft Jan. 20, 1997) (indicating that a license of
information doesn't transfer title to the licensed copy unless expressly indicated in the
contract terms).
110 O'Rourke, supra note 4, at 495 n.60.
. The committee notes on the first sale provision distinguish contract breach and
copyright infringement causes of action:
This does not mean that conditions on future disposition of copies or
phonorecords, imposed by a contract between their buyer and seller,
would be unenforceable between the parties as a breach of contract, but
it does mean that they could not be enforced by an action for infringe-
ment of copyright.
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 79.
112 Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, ch. 38, sec. 10, §§ 101, 117 (94 Stat. 3015,
3028-29). The 1980 amendments changed the copyright laws in only two respects. They
added a definition of a computer program to section 101 of the Act and they added section
117, which granted certain rights to the users of copyrighted computer programs.
FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF
COPYRIGHTED WORKS (1978) [hereinafter CONTU].
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program in conjunction with a machine and that it is
used in no other manner, or
(2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival
purposes only and that all archival copies are de-
stroyed in the event that continued possession of the
computer program should cease to be rightful. Any
exact copies prepared in accordance with the provi-
sions of this section may be leased, sold, or otherwise
transferred, along with the copy from which such
copies were prepared, only as part of the lease, sale,
or other transfer of all rights in the program.
Adaptations so prepared may be transferred only
with the authorization of the copyright owner.'14
This provision only applies to "owners" of copies of computer
programs." 5  The industry practice is to license, not sell pro-
grams and therefore, as with the first sale doctrine,1 6 a copyright
owner may avoid this provision by distributing his work via license
instead of sale. There is ambiguity here as to how licenses may be
inconsistent with these provisions: Is the inconsistency with
sections 109 and 117 the mere fact that these provisions are being
"licensed" around?; or, is a license term inconsistent because it
expands the copyright owner's rights? Again, the scope of rights
under the Copyright Act is ambiguous.
C. SUMMARY
The Copyright Act gives copyright owners the exclusive right to
reproduce, distribute, perform, and display those works" 7 which
meet the subject matter requirements of the Act." 8 The Copy-
right Act's grant of rights to users of copyright protected informa-
tion limits the exclusive rights of the copyright owner. Further-
more, because of fundamental difficulties applying the Copyright
Act to software, courts have been unable to clearly delineate
114 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1994) (emphasis added).
15Id.
116 Id. § 109; see also supra Part II.B.3.
117 17 U.S.C. § 106; see supra note 87 (giving the full text of section 106).
18 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).
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between idea and expression." 9  In addition, many portions of
computer programs and databases may be unoriginal or public
domain information and therefore, are not protected by the
Copyright Act. Software producers remain uncertain regarding
which parts of their software are protected expression under the
Copyright Act. 2 ' License agreements create a broad umbrella of
contract protection for all parts of software, copyrightable and
noncopyrightable, while concurrently expanding copyright protec-
tions afforded the copyright owner. This broad contract protection,
however, may be at the expense of users' rights and possibly the
public.
The next section examines the typical terms used by software
producers in mass-market licenses to create contractual protection
for information products.
III. MASS-MARKET LICENSES AND TERMS
This section explains the purposes motivating the use of licenses,
examines the substance of some typical mass-market license terms,
and considers the impact of particular terms on the rights of
parties to contracts in the digital information context.
A. WHAT IS A MASS-MARKET LICENSE?
Article 2B defines a mass-market license as a standard form,
non-negotiated contract prepared for and used in retail transac-
tions.' The information industry uses these licenses for conve-
nience, to lower transaction costs, to avoid the first sale doctrine,
and to ensure greater certainty and scope of protection.'22 The
shrink-wrap license form is convenient because it can be mass-
... O'Rourke, supra note 4, at 493.
120id.
121 U.C.C. § 2B-102(25) (Proposed Draft Jan. 20, 1997). The statute provides:
'Mass-market license' means a standard form prepared for and used in
a retail market for information which is directed to the general public as
a whole under substantially the same terms for the same information, if
the licensee is an end-user licensee and acquired the information in a
transaction under terms and in a quantity consistent with an ordinary
transaction in the general retail distribution.
122 O'Rourke, supra note 4, at 495.
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produced along with the retail products and requires no signatures
or customization. That convenience, in turn, lowers transaction
costs allowing high volume, retail sales. Conducting individual
negotiations with each purchaser of a retail software product would
be cost prohibitive.'23
The restrictive terms in licenses essentially "buttress" copyright
protection and provide protection where none exists. 24 Mass-
market licenses allow producers to prohibit almost all unfavorable
uses of their products and contractually bind the parties to those
terms. Thus licenses create greater certainty and an expanded
scope of protection.'25
B. ANALYSIS OF LICENSE TERMS
Most licensed digital products contain a mix of copyrightable and
noncopyrightable information, but courts have had particular
difficulty making this distinction in the software context. 126 This
section analyzes several typical license terms with respect to their
impacts on both kinds of information.
1. Copyrightable Works: Terms of Mass-Market Licenses Altering
the Federal Copyright Bargain. For the most part license terms
track the provisions of the Copyright Act. 127 Some terms, howev-
er, expand the copyright owner's protection while restricting the
user rights normally afforded by the Copyright Act with respect to
copyrightable subject matter.
a. Use of License Instead of Sale Avoids Copyright Act Provi-
sions Granting Rights To "Owners" of Copies. The first sale
doctrine allows the "owner" of a copy of a copyrighted work to
dispose of that copy by any means he sees fit. 128 In addition,
section 117 of the Copyright Act allows the "owners" of a copy of
software to make copies and modify the software for specific
purposes. 29 The retail purchaser of a digital information product
123 id.
1
'
2 Id. at 497 n.67.
1
'
2 Id. at 497.
12 O'Rourke, supra note 4, at 492-93.
12 Id. at 490.
128 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1994); H.R. REP No. 94-1476, at 79-90 (1976).
129 17 U.S.C. § 117.
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that comes with a shrink-wrap license is not the "owner" of that
copy, but rather is a "licensee." 3 ° Mass-market licenses typically
include a term specifying that title to the copy of software has not
passed to the licensee, and therefore, the licensee does not "own"
the copy.' 3 ' Under Article 2B, this term is enforceable because
the terms of the contract control the issue of title.132  It then
follows that under the plain language of the Copyright Act,133 the
right to make necessary modifications and to control subsequent
dispositions is conferred only on owners and does not vest in a
licensee.
The use of a license instead of a sale implies that first sale
doctrine and section 117 rights to control subsequent transfer and
use do not vest in a licensee because he is not an "owner" of the
copy. To ensure this result most licenses will also include terms
expressly preventing the exercise of those rights. A term providing
that the user "may not loan, lease, distribute or transfer" the
software or any copies of the software thwarts the right of a
software purchaser to control the subsequent use of that copy under
section 109.131 Prohibitions on uses for any purpose other than
those specified in the license, 135 as well as terms prohibiting
reverse engineering, expressly prevent a user from making
modifications for achieving interoperability as allowed by section
117 of the Copyright Act.1
3 6
b. Copying and Other Uses Allowed Under the Copyright Act.
Almost all commercial software licenses will include a blanket
prohibition on copying.137  Almost never will a license contain
provisions granting the user even limited copying or use rights as
'30 U.C.C. § 2B-102(25) (Proposed Draft Jan. 20 1997).
131 West Software License Agreement, supra note 82 (on file with author) ("Title. Title
to the Software is not transferred to User. Ownership of all copies of the Software and of
copies made by User is vested in West .... ") (emphasis added).
'32 U.C.C. § 2B-501.
'33 17 U.S.C. at §§ 109, 117.
"3 West Software License Agreement, supra note 82.
135 Id.
136 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1994).
137 West Software License Agreement, supra note 82 ("Copying. The License permits User
to make that number of copies of the software necessary for use [in connection with West
services and products] at its licensed site.... All other copying is prohibited .... Other
Restrictions. ... User may not reproduce all or any portion of the Software ... or the
Documentation.") (emphasis added).
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prescribed in the Copyright Act. For example, West's software
licenses include prohibitions on copying in two different terms and
unambiguously prohibit even de minimus copying. 3 ' This type
of license term is referred to as a "copyright/proprietary rights
notice."'39 The separate use of the words "copyright" and "propri-
etary rights" indicates that the software owner clearly intends the
license to give the owner proprietary rights in the software, in
addition to those rights granted by the Copyright Act. 4 °
These additional proprietary rights of the software owner
diminish the rights the Copyright Act grants users. License terms
restricting use of a product to "the rights of use granted to the User
in this Agreement,"' or other similar language, grant affirma-
tive rights to the user. However, the grant is exclusive to those
uses enumerated in the license. Thus, by negative implication, the
affirmative grant denies the user any use allowed by the Copyright
Act that is not expressly granted by the license. The "proprietary
rights" of the software licensor' thereby eradicate the rights of
libraries and archives to copy,' the right to copy computer
programs,'44 performance and display rights,'45 secondary trans-
mission rights,'46 and ephemeral recording rights.'47 The next
section discusses the impact of license terms on fair use rights.
c. Fair Use Restrictions On All Users of Licensed Information.
Notwithstanding the Copyright Act's general prohibition on
copying, anyone rightfully possessing a copy of copyright protected
materials may copy the information under the fair use doctrine. 4 '
However, license terms can obliterate this right. For example, the
license agreement that comes with West's software includes a term
13 West Software License Agreement, supra note 82.
13
9 id.
'4o 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
1 West Software License Agreement, supra note 82 (limiting use of software to use in
connection with West products and services).
142 Lemley, supra note 6 at 1262.
'43 17 U.S.C. § 108 (1994); supra Part II.B.2.
'" 17 U.S.C. § 117; supra Part II.B.4.
1'4 17 U.S.C. § 110; supra note 89.
'46 17 U.S.C. § 111; supra note 89.
147 17 U.S.C. § 112; supra note 89.
'4 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994); supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the fair use provision of the
Copyright Act).
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on "Copying".'49 The term explicitly restricts the user to copying
only for purposes of installing the software for use at the licensed
site. 5 ° The license's broad proscription of copying would presum-
ably prohibit all copying allowed under the fair use doctrine, 5'
regardless of the legality of that copying under the four factors
analysis.'52
d. Proscription of Reverse Engineering. Most licenses prohibit
reverse engineering and/or decompilation,"'5 which have been
held in some cases to be fair uses.5 4 One justification advanced
for restraints on reverse engineering is that such a prohibition is
necessary to give incentive to the work's producer who may invest
millions of dollars in the product and wants to recoup his invest-
ment. 1
55
There are two counter arguments, however, that reverse
engineering as a fair use should be preserved. First, reverse
engineering is difficult, costs almost as much as the original
development, and often takes as long as a de novo effort, and
therefore, it is not free-riding on the efforts of another.'56 Second,
restricting reverse engineering thwarts progress, the ultimate
constitutional goal, because technological works build on prior
efforts.5 7 Numerous articles on reverse engineering draw a
149 West Software License Agreement, supra note 82.
"SoId. In other words, if you want to use the software, you may copy it to the hard drive
of a computer for use on that computer. The license further provides that the software's
"copyright/proprietary rights notice(s)" must be included with any copy made and "[a]ll other
copying is prohibited." Id. The restriction thus runs with the software and applies to any
third party who may use it.
151 17 U.S.C. § 107 (allowing copying for purposes of"criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching, ... scholarship, or research"). There may, of course, be independent bars on
enforcing the contract prohibition on copying, such as free speech.
152 17 U.S.C. § 107.
15 O'Rourke, supra note 4, at 517, nn.164-65; see, e.g., West Software License Agreement,
supra note 82 ("User may not.., reverse engineer or otherwise attempt to discern the source
code of the Software.).
" Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1015
(Fed. Cir. 1992); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1561 (9th Cir. 1992).
" O'Rourke, supra note 4, at 497, n.69.
156 Id,
157 See Sega Enters. Ltd., 977 F.2d at 1510; Atari Games Corp., 975 F.2d at 832. The
Atari court rejected the notion that software computer companies could build Chinese Walls
out of copyright protected work around unprotected ideas. In Sega, the court found copyright
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variety of conclusions as to when reverse engineering is permissi-
ble. The discord among commentators about the scope of this right
illustrates the difficulty in using state contract law to address the
issue.'58
2. Noncopyrightable Works. As noted before, licenses generally
cover noncopyrightable as well as copyrightable information, but it
is difficult to determine where the line between the two is
drawn. 5 9 In the preemption analysis, it is necessary to question
whether some information is not protected because Congress
intended that information to belong to the public domain, or is it
not protected because Congress intended to leave protection to the
states. 6 ° To analyze the impact of license terms, however, one
only needs to know that the information is not protected by the
Copyright Act. Noncopyrightable information in software may
include ideas,' methods of operation,6 2  and unoriginal
data.'63 All of the restrictive terms discussed in the previous
section apply to both copyrightable and noncopyrightable informa-
tion, however, the impact of the terms is slightly different when
applied to noncopyrightable information.
License terms that prohibit copying of noncopyrightable data
create copyright-like protection." In addition, the scope of
protection created via license is much broader than Copyright Act
protection because the additional restrictions license terms place on
copyrightable information as to subsequent distribution, fair uses
and reverse engineering,"' also apply to the noncopyrightable
infringement but upheld a fair use defense. Both cases, however, were copyright
infringement causes of action and not breach of contract cases; see also O'Rourke, supra note
4, at 504 (laying out Atari test); id. at 509 (recommending a three prong fair use test for
decompiling).
158 O'Rourke, supra note 3, at 67 n.75.
1"8 Supra Part II.A.
'60 Lemley, supra note 6, at 1258 (citing Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 178
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 129 (1973)).
161 Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 839, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1015, 1020 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
162 Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 818, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1014,
1023 (1st Cir. 1995), affd by an equally divided court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996).
"e ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1166 (7th
Cir. 1996) (ProCD II).
164 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
" See supra Part III.B.1.
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information. Thus, where some license terms may reinforce or
exand the existing Copyright Act protection for copyrightable
information, those terms also create an independent basis of
protection for information that was previously unprotected by the
Copyright Act.
3. Scope of Protection and Rights Under Contract Versus
Copyright. When comparing the protections afforded by contract
with the Copyright Act's protections, two issues regarding scope of
protection arise: (1) determining the duration of protection; and (2)
identifying the affected parties. Copyright Act protection is for a
limited duration,'66 however, a contract relationship can be forev-
er." 7 In addition the parties to the contract are not necessarily
limited to the software producer and the retail purchaser. The
license may be embedded in the software itself, ensuring that all
users of the software are bound by the license provisions.168
C. SUMMARY
The Copyright Act confers exclusive rights on the copyright
owner 169 while reserving certain rights to users of copyright
protected works. v° Because the software context presents uncer-
tainty about the scope of actual protection and the allocation of
rights under the Copyright Act, the information industry routinely
relies on contractual protection of its products. The license terms
track the Copyright Act for the most part, but in totality, those
terms can create much broader protection than the Copyright Act.
Mass-market licenses generally prohibit all copying, including
that allowed under the fair use"' and safe haven'72 provisions
of the Copyright Act, modification necessary to use the soft-
ware,173 subsequent distribution,'74 and reverse engineering'75
166 U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-305 (1994).
167 This is, of course, hypothetical and venturing into the limitations on contract duration
is outside the scope of this article.
16 Elkin-Koren, supra note 5, at 102-05.
1'69 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994).
170 Id. §§ 107-12, 117.
171 Id. § 107.
172 Id. §§ 108-12.
173 Id. § 117.
174 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1994).
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of copyrightable and noncopyrightable information. Most contracts
do not have a set termination date, so these restrictions last for an
unlimited duration. Furthermore, technological fencing in the form
of "click-here" license agreements ensures that all users of software
are bound by the license terms.' 6  My analysis of shrink-wrap
license terms is not intended to be a parade of horribles on behalf
of an argument that shrink-wrap licenses should be banned.
Rather, my analysis of typical software license terms illustrates
that each term cannot simply be deemed "inconsistent" with rights
under the Copyright Act. Each term is subject to a number of
interpretations and raises a variety of issues. Even a cursory
analysis of each license term reveals ambiguities, which further
complicate the unique legal issues involved in applying federal
preemption law and make a determination of whether a license
terms is "inconsistent" even more difficult.
IV. ENFORCEABILITY OF MASS MARKET LICENSE TERMS:
FEDERAL PREEMPTION AND THE ROLE OF STATE CONTRACT LAW
It is clear that particular license terms alter the allocation of
rights under the Copyright Act.' The core question, however,
is whether those license terms are preempted by federal law. 178
This is the essential issue because the underlying justification for
state action to clarify mass-market enforceability hinges on the
threat of eminent preemption of those terms.' 9 This Part exam-
ines the current state of the law regarding preemption of intellectu-
al property contracts8 ° and then discusses the role of state
contract law and the particular implications of the McManis
.7. Id. § 107; Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843-44, 24
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1015, 1023-24 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
176 Elkin-Koren, supra note 5, at 102-05.
177 See discussion supra Part III (discussing typical mass-market license terms and their
effect on the rights to intellectual property).
171 Certain terms may be unenforceable under contract law because they are inconsistent
with prior agreements or are unconscionable. Lemley, supra note 6, at 1254. This article
focuses on the preemption issue and generally leaves the contract analysis to another
discussion.
179 See discussion supra Part I.c. (discussing McManis' purpose in proposing an
amendment to U.C.C. Article 2B).
iso See discussion infra Part IV.A.
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Proposal in addressing preemption in the digital information
context. 18' Even if the current law clearly pointed toward pre-
emption of license terms that modify the property rights allocation
of the Copyright Act, effectuating federal preemption to enforce the
Copyright bargain may be beyond the scope of state statutory law.
The complicated federal policy determinations inherent in preemp-
tion law,8 2 the differing impacts individual terms have on the
copyright bargain,'83 and the need for a uniform determination of
an issue that is national in scope are factors which support the
argument against using the U.C.C. to address federal preemption
of license terms.
84
A. COPYRIGHT PREEMPTION AND MASS-MARKET LICENSES
18 5
Shrink-wrap license terms that purport to alter the rights
granted to purchasers and licensees under patent or copyright law
may be preempted by federal intellectual property law.'86 Several
courts have held, or strongly suggested, that federal statutes
preempt state contract law to the extent that contract law permits
the parties to "opt out" of some parts of the federal statutory
scheme. Other courts have found a continuing role for contract
law, even where it conflicts with federal law.
1. Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd. One of the first decisions
addressing preemption of contract rights in intellectual property
was Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd.187 That case involved
Vault's copy protection program called Prolok, which was designed
to prevent unlawful duplication of other software by "locking" it.
Vault sold Prolok with a shrink-wrap license, which provided in
relevant part that the purchaser could not copy or reverse engineer
any part of the software. Quaid purchased a copy of Prolok and
181 See discussion infra Part IV.B.
'
8 2 Infra Part IV.A.
183 Supra Part III.B.
'84 Infra Part IV.B.
" The information in this section is largely taken from Lemley, supra note 6 and
O'Rourke, supra note 3.
18 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1994) (giving parameters for preemption).
87Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1281 (5th Cir.
1988).
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reverse engineered it in order to find a way to defeat the copy
protection program. Quaid incorporated its knowledge of Prolok in
an "unlocking" product it sold called Ramkey. The final version of
Ramkey did not contain any material copied from Prolok.'88
Vault sued Quaid, alleging copyright infringement and violation
of the shrink-wrap license provision. The Fifth Circuit found that
Quaid's reverse engineering constituted a fair use under the
Copyright Act and, therefore, was not infringing.'89
Vault's second claim relied on Quaid violating the terms of the
shrink-wrap license. The Louisiana Software License Enforcement
Act specifically authorized contractual terms prohibiting reverse
engineering. 90 The Fifth Circuit found that the Louisiana stat-
ute directly conflicted with the rights of purchasers of copyrighted
works set out in section 117 of the Copyright Act, and was
therefore preempted by federal copyright law. The court relied on
a venerable line of Supreme Court cases for the proposition that
"[wihen state law touches upon the area of [patent or copyright
statutes], it is 'familiar doctrine' that the federal policy 'may not be
set at naught, or its benefits denied' by the state law."'
Courts9 2 and commentators9 3 have endorsed Vault's conclu-
sion that state law cannot expand the rights granted to authors
under the copyright law. Vault expressly rejects state enforcement
of a license term that denies a right conferred on a user by the
Copyright Act.' Furthermore, Vault's invocation of the Sears-
1 88 Id. at 256-58.
189 Id. at 261-68.
'90 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1964 (West 1987) (Supp. 1998) (preempted by federal
copyright law in Vault Corp., 847 F.2d at 270). The Louisiana statute not only allowed the
prohibition of reverse engineering, it also authorized contracts prohibiting any copying,
forever, and did not limit its requirements to original works of authorship. Vault Corp., 847
F.2d at 269.
'9' Vault Corp., 847 F.2d at 269-70 (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S.
225, 140 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 524 (1964)); accord Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376
U.S. 234, 140 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 528 (1964) (following the reasoning of Sears).
"
9 See Foresight Resources Corp. v. Pfortmiller, 719 F. Supp. 1006, 1010, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1721, 1724 (D. Kan. 1989) (holding that application of Kansas law would deny the
defendant section 117 benefits).
193 PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 20, at 220 (stating that a license which restricts
the fair use of a work has "no legal effect").
194 Vault Corp., 847 F.2d at 270.
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Compco.95 reasoning suggests a broader basis for preempting
state enforcement of license terms: where a license term does not
"directly conflict" with the Copyright Act but does interfere with
"federal polic[ies]," state contract law enforcing that term is
preempted. 96 The holding of Vault seems to support the McMan-
is Proposal's rejection of license terms that are inconsistent with
Copyright Act provisions that confer benefits on users of software.
However, not all license terms relating to the subject matter of
copyright are necessarily preempted.'97
2. National Car Rental System, Inc. v. Computer Associates Int'l,
Inc. In National Car Rental Systems, Inc.,98 Computer Associ-
ates licensed software to National for use in National's internal
operations. National used the software for its internal operation
and allowed its subcontractor to use the software for two other
companies. 99 Computer Associates sued and alleged two claims
against National: (1) copyright infringement by distribution of the
program; and (2) breach of contract by allowing unauthorized use
of the program. 00 The court dismissed the first claim because
there had not been distribution within the meaning of the Copy-
right Act.20' The court then considered whether copyright law
preempted a license term that limited the licensee to using the
software for internal purposes and applied the Copyright Act's
preemption provision.20 2 Section 301 preempts a state cause of
action when two conditions are met:203 (1) the work protected by
state law is within the subject matter of copyright as defined in
19 Compco Corp., 376 U.S. at 234; Sears, Roebuck & Co., 376 U.S. at 225.
196 Compco Corp., 376 U.S. at 237.
"9 Lemley, supra note 6, at 1257.
198 National Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc, 991 F.2d 426, 26
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1370 (8th Cir. 1993).199 /d.
29 Id.
201 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1994).
'2o Id. § 301. The statute provides in part "all legal or equitable rights that are
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified
by section 106 in works of authorship that... come within the subject matter of copyright
as specified by sections 102 and 103... are governed exclusively by this title." Id. § 301(a).
2 National Car Rental Sys., 991 F.2d at 428-29 (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.
v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 200, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 321, 326 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'd on
other grounds, 471 U.S. 539, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1073 (1985)).
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sections 102 and 103 of the Copyright Act;2 °4 and (2) the state law
created right is equivalent to any of the exclusive copyright
privileges enumerated in section 106 of the Act.2" 5 The court held
that the software was copyrightable subject matter satisfying the
first prong, but that contract law was not preempted because it did
not grant rights equivalent to those offered by copyright. °6 The
court applied the "extra element" test and found that the contract
cause of action included an element not required by copyright, an
agreement between the parties. °7 The court cited the legislative
history of section 301 in support of its holding: "Nothing in the bill
derogates from the rights of parties to contract with each other and
to sue for breaches of contract." °8
Applying this rationale it appears that, contrary to Vault, a
license term enforced under state contract law would never be
preempted under section 301 because it will always contain an
extra element not present in a copyright action. National can be
reconciled with Vault, however, because the court in National did
not have to decide whether the license agreement would be
preempted if the terms directly contradicted rights granted to the
user under copyright law. ProCD presents yet another circum-
stance where software license terms have been subjected to
preemption analysis.
3. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg. In ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, °9
ProCD marketed an electronic database of noncopyrightable
telephone listings21° that Zeidenberg purchased.2 1' The soft-
ware included a shrink-wrap license limiting the use of the
software and telephone listings to non-commercial purposes.212
National Car Rental Sys., 991 F.2d at 428-29.
Id.
2m Id. at 431-35.
2 id.
' Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5748).
21 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (7th Cir. 1996)
(ProCD II).
210 Id. at 1449; see Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 18
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1275 (1991) (holding that alphabetically organized telephone directory
listings lack the originality required for copyright protection); see also supra note 79, and
accompanying text (comparing judicial treatment of alphabetical telephone directory with
electronic database of phone numbers).
211 ProCD H, 86 F.3d at 1449.
212 id.
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Zeidenberg assented to the license terms, and then, believing the
use restriction unenforceable, he made the database available on
the Internet for a fee.21 ProCD sued Zeidenberg alleging, among
other claims, breach of contract, but the district court held that the
license was not validly formed as a matter of contract law and
refused to enforce it.
214
On appeal the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit held that the contract was validly formed 21" and then
considered whether the license terms were preempted by section
301 of the Copyright Act.216 In applying section 301, the court
treated the data ag falling within the subject matter of copy-
right,217 but held that the action to enforce the license was not
preempted because it was qualitatively different from a breach of
contract claim.218  The court's holding turned on the difference
between the scope of rights under the Copyright Act and under
contract law. The court emphasized that copyright protection is
good against the world, but contract rights exist only between the
parties to the agreement. 21 9  Thus, the rights created by private
contract are not equivalent to the rights granted by the Copyright
Act. 220 The court did not use the extra element test in applying
section 301221 and succeeded in creating yet another twist on the
preemption analysis of license terms.222 Writing for the court,
213 Id. at 1450.
214 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 655, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1513, 1524-25
(W.D. Wis. 1996) (ProCD I).
215 ProCD H, 86 F.3d at 1452.
216 Id. at 1453.
217 Both supporters and critics of ProCD H have pointed out this flaw in the court's
application of section 301. Compare O'Rourke, supra note 3, at 74, n.109 (arguing that
ProCD was correctly decided but noting the court's error in treating the data as if it were
copyrightable even though it lacked the requisite originality under Feist) with McManis,
supra note 57 (criticizing the outcome of ProCD II and questioning the court's conclusion that
data not sufficiently original to be copyrighted is still within the "subject matter of
copyright").
218 ProCD H, 86 F.3d at 1454-55.
219 Id. at 1454.
220id.
'O'Rourke, supra note 3, at 75.
'2 The ProCD II case has drawn a lot of criticism for its unorthodox, and perhaps
erroneous, reasoning. See, e.g., Elkin-Koren, supra note 5, at 103 (arguing that the ProCD
II analysis of legal rights fails to take into account the ability of software manufacturers to
prevent the existence of third parties to the contract through technological fencing); Recent
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Judge Easterbrook focused on the business necessity of using
shrink-wrap licenses to control the use of digital information and
concluded that restrictive terms facilitate the accessibility of
information by allowing software producers to sell in the retail
marketplace without fear of unauthorized copying. He did not,
however, address the policy articulated in Feist that a central goal
of the federal intellectual property regime is maintaining a viable
public domain.223
The previous three cases illustrate the sparsity and inconsistency
of federal appellate cases regarding the legal issues involved in
determining the enforceability of shrink-wrap license terms in light
of the Copyright Act. Previous to ProCD II, virtually no reported
decisions had actually enforced shrink-wrap license provisions as
written, especially where those provisions modified federal law.2 24
Vault provides some guidance for analyzing license terms that
directly conflict with Copyright Act grants of user rights. National
Car Rental Systems, Inc. provides an analytical framework for
applying the extra element test in the licensing context.22 5
ProCD II, on the other hand, essentially justified abrogation of a
critical user's right, access to public domain information, by relying
on market factors. In light of the current case law on preemption
of shrink-wrap license terms, I now consider the role of state
contract law in determining the enforceability of license terms.
B. THE ROLE OF STATE CONTRACT LAW
In support of a state statute regulating shrink-wrap license
terms, McManis asserts that:
Given the unsettled state of existing federal appel-
late case law on this point, it is not at all clear that
Case, Contract Law -Shrink-wrap Licenses -Seventh Circuit Holds that Shrink-wrap License
are Enforceable - ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996), 110 HARV. L. REV.
1946 (1997) (criticizing ProCD II for giving copyright-like protection to information that
belongs in the public domain).
' O'Rourke, supra note 3, at 76.
Lemley, supra note 6, at 1259.
National Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Intl, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 431-35,
26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1370, 1374-78 (8th Cir. 1993).
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mass-market licenses made enforceable under
[s]ection 2B-308 would survive preemption under
[slection 301 of the Copyright Act of 1976,226 where
the practical effect of enforcement would be to
deprive virtually the entire public from 1) gaining
access to an uncopyrightable and unpatented idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, discovery, or data contained in
widely-distributed federally copyrightable subject
matter; or 2) engaging in any other conduct that
would otherwise constitute a fair use of widely-
distributed federally copyrightable subject mat-
ter.
227
To illustrate, McManis compared the holdings in ProCD, Inc. v.
Zeidenberg228 and Wright v. Warner Books, Inc.229 In ProCD H,
the Seventh Circuit held that federal copyright law does not
preempt enforcement of the shrink-wrap license against a purchas-
er of the software and database who, with knowledge of the
restriction, nevertheless made commercial use of the computer
program and database. 23 0  The court stated in dictum that "[tlo
the extent licenses facilitate distribution of object code while
concealing the source code (the point of a clause forbidding
disassembly), they serve the same procompetitive functions as does
the law of trade secrets."23 ' Wright held that a contractual term
purporting to prohibit publication of unpublished library archive
manuscripts "in whole or in part unless such publication is
specifically authorized," should not be construed in such a way as
to prohibit a biographer from using the manuscripts for scholarly
2 The statute provides: "Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent
right in any such work under the common law or statutes of any State." 17 U.S.C. § 301
(1995).
Charles R. McManis, McManis - UCC Article 2B (visited Sept. 23, 1998)
<httpJ/www.ali.org/ali/mcmanis.htm>.
' ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (7th Cir. 1996)
(ProCD II).
' Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1892 (2d Cir. 1991).
23 ProCD H, 86 F.3d at 1453-55.
231 ProCD H, 86 F.3d at 1455.
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purposes.232 The court further stated that it "defies common
sense to construe this agreement as giving scholars access to
manuscripts with one hand but then prohibiting them from using
the manuscripts in any meaningful way with the other."233 The
ProCD II view saw the user's right as alienable and found the
software company conditioned access to its information on the
user's waiver of those rights. The Wright court found support in
Salinger v. Random House, Inc.,234 for the proposition that some
fair use rights cannot be denied and such a denial does not comport
with the copyright owners limited rights under the Copyright
Act.
235
McManis asserts that state contract law should not codify the
enforceability of restrictive license terms because case-law is
unsettled as to whether the Copyright Act preempts state enforce-
ment of those license terms.23 6 At least two courts, however, have
rejected preemption of these licenses.237 One might speculate
that because McManis' argument is not based on conclusive,
judicial authority that instead, it stems from his advocacy of a
particular outcome: preemption of restrictive license terms. Courts
and commentators may be in disagreement over the legality of
mass-market licenses, but the information industry has made them
a standard feature of digital information products. The industry
recognizes the possibility of preemption by including license terms
that allow any unenforceable term to be severed.238 Interestingly,
232 Wright, 953 F.2d at 740.
2m Id. at 741.
2' Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 650 F.Supp. 413, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev'd on other
grounds, 811 F.2d 90, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673 (2d Cir. 1987).
' Id. ("To read [restrictions agreed upon as a condition for obtaining access to
unpublished manuscripts in a library archive] as absolutely forbidding any quotation, no
matter how limited or appropriate, would severely inhibit proper, lawful scholarly use and
place an arbitrary power in the hands of the copyright owner going far beyond the protection
provided by law," quoted in Wright, 953 F.2d at 741).
' Charles R. McManis, McManis - UCC Article 2B, (visited Sept. 23, 1998),
<httpJ/www.ali.org/ali/mcmanis.htm>.
"
37 See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (7th Cir.
1996) (holding that a shrink-wrap license constituted a valid contract prohibiting the
commercial use of the program); National Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l,
Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 431-35, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1370, 1374-78 (8th Cir. 1993).
m West Software License Agreement, supra note 82 ("Should any provision of this
Agreement be held ... illegal by a court, the validity and enforceability of the other
provisions will not be affected").
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McManis' position is aligned with consumer advocates who oppose
restrictive mass-market licenses. The consumer groups' central
concern is the high cost to society exacted by granting information
broad protection at the expense of public knowledge.239 Consum-
er advocates are worried that state laws will give too much
protection to some kinds of works and will run roughshod over the
statutory limits on protection outlined in the Copyright Act.240 In
particular, this group objects to contract protection of previously
"public domain" categories of information: ideas, facts, and
unoriginal compilations.2 4' Furthermore, they object strenuously
to any expansion of the protection afforded copyrightable works by
allowing licenses to proscribe fair uses of works.242
McManis may be right about the preemption of terms inconsis-
tent with the Copyright Act, and his concern for the integrity of the
federal intellectual property regime is more than justified by the
widespread use of licenses to supplant it. Unfortunately, the
vehicle he has chosen for his message is not the right one for two
reasons. First, the underlying goal of the Article 2B drafting effort
is to codify commercial practice, not to make intellectual property
law. The widespread commercial practice in the retail information
industry is to use mass-market licenses with terms that alter the
rights of information users. The McManis Proposal would alter the
commercial status quo by deeming many typical license terms
unenforceable.
Second, it is because of the uncertainty in the federal judiciary,
and not in spite of it, that the legal determination of preemption
should not be codified in Article 2B. The ProCD cases demonstrate
'9 Gail Hillenbrand, Hillenbrand Comment - UCC Article 2B (last visited Sept. 23, 1998)
<http'//www.ali.orglali/hillga.htm> (commenting on the draft in her capacity as a consumer
advocate employed by Consumers' Union); Memo to NCCUSL Commissioners from Ralph
Nader, July 18, 1997 (on file with author) (recognizing McManis Proposal as an attempt to
preserve user, read consumer, rights granted by the fair use provisions of the Copyright Act
of 1976); Quinlan, supra note 5, at p. Dl.
24 Gail Hillenbrand, Hillenbrand Comment - UCC Article 2B (last visited Sept. 23, 1998)
<http'//www.ali.org/ali/hillga.htm> (commenting on the draft in her capacity as a consumer
advocate employed by Consumers' Union); Memo to NCCUSL Commissioners from Ralph
Nader, July 18, 1997 (on file with author) (recognizing McManis Proposal as an attempt to
preserve user, read consumer, rights granted by the fair use provisions of the Copyright Act
of 1976); Quinlan, supra note 5, at p. D1.
241 Hillenbrand, supra note 239.
242 Id.
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that the preemption issue is a live one and that it ultimately may
be resolved in favor of the shrink-wrap license. Furthermore, there
are bills in Congress which may resolve some, but probably not all,
of these issues." At the very least, the complexity of applying
preemption analysis in the intellectual property context244 and
the myriad of factors which must be analyzed in the case of each
license term,245 suggests that the enforceability of particular
mass-market license terms should be made by the courts on an ad
hoc basis.
C. SUMMARY
The federal courts have looked at some restrictive license
provisions, but the cases are few and the opinions conflicting.
Thus, a uniform state law addressing contract formation issues
would be useful for providing guidance to commercial entities who
rely heavily on these licenses and the federal courts interpreting
state contract law. On the other hand, determining whether
particular license terms are preempted by the Copyright Act
presents complex issues of law that can ultimately only be decided
by federal courts or Congress. A state law prohibiting terms that
are "inconsistent" with the Copyright Act rings hollow without a
clear understanding of what terms are inconsistent and therefore,
preempted. Furthermore, the law would disrupt current commer-
cial practices, a result that is contrary to U.C.C. policy and
suggests a motive driven by non-commercial, public policy concerns.
States may expressly choose a policy that prohibits particular terms
as unfair to users, regardless of the preemption issues. That type
of policy consideration, however, is outside the scope of the U.C.C.
and is a matter more appropriate for state legislators to decide.
Furthermore, a U.C.C. provision that delves into preemption may
not be enacted by information-industry-friendly state legislatures,
or, if enacted, would be amended resulting in non-uniform laws, a
result that is also contrary to the goals of the U.C.C. Should states
m See, e.g., H.R. 2441, 104th Cong. (1995) (discussing proposed National Information
Infrastructure Copyright Act); H.R. 3531, 104th Cong. (1996) (proposing a new form of legal
protection for databases).
2" See Lemley, supra note 6, at 1269.
See discussion supra Part III.B.
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act individually, the information industry can use forum selection
and choice of law clauses in their licensing agreements to ensure
that they battle licensees in the states where these issues will be
resolved in favor of their proprietary interests. The resulting
patchwork of law would be an especially perverse outcome consider-
ing that the integrity of the Copyright Act is of national concern.
Article 2B should take a truly neutral approach in addressing the
issues of federal preemption. The most recent draft has replaced
the McManis Proposal with a new provision. NCCUSL has adopted
section 105 that simply recognizes that some license terms may be
preempted by federal law.24 Section 105 reflects the commercial
reality of the information industry, which relies heavily on mass-
market licenses, but recognizes that particular terms may be
preempted. The current commercial practice is to use severability
provisions to ensure that only the preempted terms fail and that
the remainder of the license is still enforceable.247
V. CONCLUSION
The looming possibility of federal preemption of shrink-wrap
license terms is asserted as the central justification for the
McManis Proposal. Ultimately, I do not argue that certain license
terms are, or are not, preempted. Nor do I argue for, or against,
the trend toward privatized intellectual property rights. Rather, I
contend that blanket preemption by state statute is a solution that
falls short of the analysis required to resolve the complex intersec-
tion of federal copyright law and freedom of contract. Considering
the varying effects individual license terms have on the copyright
bargain, the complexities of preemption analysis in the intellectual
property area, and the conflicting and sparse federal appellate case
law on preemption of restrictive licenses, a potentially non-uniform,
state contract law is wholly inadequate for resolving the preemp-
tion issue. In particular, fair use analysis requires each license
term to be considered individually by the federal courts. Even
then, the outcome of preemption analysis of particular terms is not
2" U.C.C. § 2B-105 (Proposed Draft Nov. 1997).
" West Software License Agreement, supra note 238 and accompanying text.
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generally predictable.248 Maintaining the integrity of the Copy-
right Act, and through it the public domain, may require preemp-
tion of some mass-market license terms, but "federal preemption,
S.. after all, is a matter of first concern to the federal courts"
24 9
and not to the state courts or legislatures.
ELIZABETH J. MCCLURE
' When he rejects the holding of ProCD II, McManis acknowledges that he is uncertain
how the preemption issue will ultimately be resolved. McManis, supra note 227.
9 White v. Samsung Electronics Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1518, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1362, 1368 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
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